A Self-Inflicted "Crisis": New York's Medical Malpractice Insurance Troubles Caused By Flawed State Rate Setting and Raid on Rainy Day Fund by Peter Gosselar
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Self-Inflicted “Crisis” 
New York’s Medical Malpractice Insurance Troubles  
Caused By Flawed State Rate Setting 
and Raid on Rainy Day Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2007
  
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
This report was produced by the Congress Watch division of Public Citizen. The primary authors 
of A Self-Inflicted “Crisis:” New York’s Medical Malpractice Insurance Troubles Caused By 
Flawed State Rate Setting and Raid on Rainy Day Fund were Congress Watch Researcher Peter 
Gosselar, Special Counsel Barry Boughton and Research Director Taylor Lincoln. Peter Lurie, 
deputy director of Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, provided methodological guidance. 
Congress Watch Director Laura MacCleery supervised and edited the report. Russ Haven, 
legislative counsel of the New York Public Interest Research Group and Art Levin, director of 
the Center for Medical Consumers, provided invaluable editorial input and assistance.  
 
 
 
About Public Citizen 
Public Citizen is a 90,000 member non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C. We 
represent consumer interests through lobbying, litigation, research and public education. 
Founded in 1971, Public Citizen fights for consumer rights in the marketplace, safe and 
affordable health care, campaign finance reform, fair trade, clean and safe energy sources, and 
corporate and government accountability. Public Citizen has five divisions and is active in every 
public forum: Congress, the courts, governmental agencies and the media. Congress Watch is 
one of the five divisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Citizen’s Congress Watch 
215 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20003 
P: 202-546-4996 
F: 202-547-7392 
http://www.citizen.org 
 
© 2007 Public Citizen. All rights reserved. 
  
Public Citizen’s Congress Watch 1 A Self-Inflicted “Crisis” 
Introduction 
 
Last summer’s decision of the New York State Insurance Department to authorize a 14-
percent increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums was accompanied by a wave of 
warnings that rates were causing a doctor-shortage “crisis” and suggestions that the insurance 
industry was in dire straits that could not be cured by the rate hike alone. Gov. Eliot Spitzer 
appointed a “Medical Malpractice Liability Task Force” to “define the major causes of medical 
malpractice and of the high cost of insurance.” 
 
Critics of the civil justice system, predictably, tried to use these purported crises to justify 
imposing an array of restrictions on New Yorkers’ legal rights. The most offensive proposal 
concerns newborns. It would deprive neurologically impaired infants of their legal rights, leaving 
their welfare to the whims of a state-run fund. Our research shows that these funds are failures in 
the two states that have conducted similar experiments with the rights of patients. 
 
In reality, the data show that most of these “crisis” claims are vastly exaggerated and 
those that are valid have nothing to do with a proliferation in litigation. It is worth noting that the 
situation in New York state is, when compared with the national medical malpractice insurance 
marketplace, an aberration. Nationally, rates are generally stable or are even slightly decreased 
from previous levels. 
 
This study examines the three plausible explanations for recent insurance rate increases 
and the financial struggles claimed by New York’s insurance providers: 1) an increase in 
litigation; 2) the combustion of poor state regulation and normal volatility in the insurance 
market; and/or 3) marked changes in the quality of patient safety.  
 
We unequivocally conclude, in the first instance, that increasing medical malpractice 
litigation is not to blame for the insurance industry’s woes or its recent rate increases. The 
evidence irrefutably demonstrates that malpractice payments in New York fell to historic lows in 
recent years and that amounts paid out either went down or rose only modestly, depending on the 
measure used. 
 
The combination of volatility in the insurance market and derelict state regulation is 
almost certainly the explanation. Insurance companies are still recovering from an eight-year 
period in which state regulators held rates stagnant. Meanwhile, the state in the 1990s raided 
nearly $700 million from the rainy-day fund of an insurance pool set up to cover risky doctors 
(those who are unable to obtain commercial insurance). When the pool suffered massive losses 
this decade, the state’s insurance providers were forced to absorb more than $500 million in red 
ink. Although more regulated than those in most states, New York’s insurance providers also 
suffered in recent years from some of the same problems that afflicted the industry nationwide – 
most notably, decreased investment income. 
 
Even though New York has not seen an increase in medical malpractice litigation, the 
state should make use of the current focus on the subject to improve patient safety. While these 
steps may not immediately ameliorate insurance rates, they would undeniably reduce 
unnecessary injuries and deaths. The data indicate that New Yorkers suffer from a chronic 
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incidence of inexcusable errors, such as wrong-site surgeries, wrong patient surgeries, and 
abandonment of foreign materials, such as sponges, in patients’ bodies. Meanwhile, an average 
of more than 550 New Yorkers a year have died since 1999 due to adverse incidents in the state’s 
hospitals – and these are just the incidents that have been reported. The state’s patient safety 
performance ranked 49th of the 50 states in a 2006 study by the independent rating organization 
Health Grades Inc. 
 
The toll exacted by bad doctors is reflected in the program that covers physicians who 
cannot obtain commercial insurance. Only about 1 percent of the New York’s doctors are in the 
program, but they have committed malpractice at such an alarming rate that they are chiefly 
responsible for the program’s loss of more than $500 million this decade.  
 
New York’s comptroller issued a report this past summer lambasting the state for inept 
oversight of suspect physicians. The comptroller’s findings were underscored by recent 
revelations that health officials delayed notifying more than 600 people that they had potentially 
been exposed to deadly diseases by a single physician improperly reusing syringes. 
Astonishingly, the state regards its investigation into the physician, Dr. Harvey Finkelstein, as a 
“non-disciplinary” matter.  
 
Although increases to medical malpractice rates exceeded inflation for the past five years, 
overall rate increases have not been onerous. From 1991 to this year’s 14-percent hike, the 
average annual increase has been merely 3.5 percent – or about half the rate of medical inflation 
over the time period. 
 
Claims by some that New York’s population of doctors is dwindling are the most absurd 
of all. By almost any standard – whether one examines the number of licensed doctors, 
practicing doctors, “at risk” specialists, or full-time equivalent doctors – New York’s doctor 
supply is higher, and healthier, than it has been in any year for which data are available.  
 
One exception, though not notable, is the much-ballyhooed purported shortage of 
obstetricians. While the number of obstetricians did drop slightly this decade, the state’s birthrate 
actually declined at a faster rate, meaning that the small change in the number of obstetricians 
had little impact on access to care.  
 
Among our key findings are: 
 
1. New York is not facing a litigation crisis. 
 
• Medical malpractice payments on behalf of doctors were only 0.61 percent of New 
York’s total medical expenses in 2004, the most recent year for which total medical 
expenses are available. Premiums were only 1.02 percent of total medical costs in 
2004. The average percentage of costs expended for premiums was lower in the first 
five years of this decade than in the entire 1990s. 
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• The number of malpractice payments in New York is at an historic low. Each of the 
last five years ranks in the bottom five out of the last 13 years in the number of 
payments per licensed physician. 
 
• The amounts paid out in malpractice payments (when adjusted for inflation on a per 
capita basis) were slightly higher over the past five years than in the preceding eleven 
years while the inflation-adjusted amounts paid out per practicing physician were 
slightly lower over the past five years. 
 
• The types of cases leading to medical malpractice payments in New York are serious, 
and compensation levels accord with the severity of the injury. Of ten categories of 
outcomes tracked by the federal government’s medical malpractice database, the five 
categories resulting in the largest payments all involve permanent injuries or death. 
 
• Deaths from adverse events are the leading cause of medical malpractice payments in 
New York. Although such cases yield only the 4th highest average payout (out of ten 
outcome categories), deaths occur at such an alarming rate that payments to grieving 
survivors account for the greatest amount of dollars paid. 
 
• Costs for cases involving brain damage, blamed by some for rising insurance rates, 
are in fact modest in comparison with other types of cases. The category for injuries 
including brain damage ranks 5th of 10 in total amounts paid out. This fact exposes 
the lunacy of the radical proposal to deprive newborn babies of their legal rights and 
cede their care to a state-run fund. Any slight savings that might result from such an 
unjust experiment would barely reduce overall medical malpractice payments in New 
York. 
 
• The number of malpractice cases in the pipeline is virtually constant. The rate of 
cases initiated over the most recent five-year period was less than 2 percent up or 
down from previous years, depending on the measure used. 
 
2. New York’s government is primarily responsible for insurance problems. 
 
• Recent medical malpractice rate hikes and financial woes claimed by the insurance 
industry are due to three main factors:  
 
1. The need for insurance companies to catch up from an eight-year period in which 
state regulators held rates stagnant;  
 
2. The state government’s expropriation of nearly $700 million from the rainy-day 
fund of a program that insured high-risk doctors and its subsequent imposition of 
a policy that forced medical malpractice insurers to absorb all of the program’s 
losses, which have totaled more than $500 million this decade; and  
 
3. The insurance market’s typical boom-bust cyclical nature. 
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3. Receiving health care in New York is unsafe. 
 
• An independent rating organization, Health Grades Inc., gives New York abysmal 
grades – ranking New York’s patient safety record 49th out of the 50 states, and 
grading the safety records of 47 percent of New York’s hospitals among the nation’s 
worst 15 percent. 
 
• New Yorkers suffer from an unconscionable frequency of inexcusable errors, such as 
surgeries on the wrong body part or, even, the wrong patient. Meanwhile, adverse 
events in hospitals have claimed the lives of more than 550 New Yorkers a year since 
1999 – and those are just the cases identified by a reporting system that notoriously 
undercounts incidents. 
 
• The state’s oversight of physicians is woefully inadequate. New York’s comptroller 
found that the state’s Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) failed to 
investigate about 175 doctors for whom investigations should have been triggered 
based on the agency’s existing criteria. Moreover, the comptroller found that the 
agency’s criteria for initiating investigations are too narrow and should be broadened. 
 
• A sliver of doctors are responsible for nearly half of the dollars paid out for medical 
malpractice in New York. Physicians who made three or more malpractice payments 
between 1990 and 2006 – accounting for no more than 4 percent of New York’s 
doctors – were responsible for nearly half (49.6 percent) of medical malpractice 
dollars paid out on behalf of doctors in the time period. Only 10.8 percent of these 
physicians experienced disciplinary action affecting their license to practice. 
 
• About 1 percent of the state’s doctors are in a program for those physicians who are 
unable to obtain commercial insurance. These doctors have made such staggering 
malpractice payments that they are chiefly responsible for the program’s losses of 
more than $500 million this decade. These losses, which commercial insurers must 
absorb on a shared basis, are largely responsible for the financial troubles the state’s 
insurers are facing. 
 
4. New York’s population of doctors is flourishing. 
 
• New York’s population of physicians is at an all-time high by numerous measures 
and its number of doctors in training is by far the highest in the country, with half-
again as many residents and fellows as California and more than twice as many as 
any other state. 
 
• The state’s slight drop in obstetricians between 2000 and 2005 was less than the 
decline in the state’s birthrate over the same time period.  
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5. New York doctors’ incomes will likely be unaffected by rising insurance premiums. 
 
• Researchers have found that premiums consistently make up only a small percentage 
of doctors’ total expenses and that rising premiums have not, historically, depressed 
physicians’ incomes. 
 
Recommendations 
 
We have a series of recommendations, which should not be treated as comprehensive. 
They are summarized here: 
 
• In a manner consistent with other health priorities, New York should refund the 
nearly $700 million it siphoned from the rainy-day fund of the insurance pool for 
high-risk doctors; 
 
• The state should consider steps to prevent future boom-bust cycles in the malpractice 
insurance industry, such as setting a minimum annual rate increase indexed to 
inflation; 
 
• The state should make a top priority of improving patient-safety; 
 
• The state should improve its woeful oversight of physicians; and 
 
• The state should take a hard look at the records of doctors who are unable to obtain 
commercial insurance. Malpractice payments by these physicians (who account for 
fewer than 1 percent of the state’s doctors) are largely responsible for the bind that 
New York finds itself in today. 
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I. New York Is Not Facing a Litigation Crisis 
 
Arguments that medical malpractice litigation is largely responsible for the marked 
increase in health care costs do not withstand scrutiny. Since 1991, when the federal government 
began collecting the data, medical malpractice payments made on behalf of physicians have 
never accounted for even as much as 1 percent of New York’s overall health care spending.  
 
The sum of medical malpractice payments made by New York’s doctors in 2004 was 
$765.8 million, accounting for only 0.61 percent of the $126.1 billion New Yorkers spent on 
health care that year (the most recent year for which such costs are available). Medical 
malpractice payments were no more than 0.77 percent of New York’s overall health care costs in 
any year since 1991. The three years in which medical malpractice consumed the highest share 
of health care costs occurred in the early 1990s.  
 
Figure 1: Malpractice Payments on Behalf of Physicians 
as Percentage of Total Health Spending in New York, 
2004
Medical Malpractice
Payouts on Behalf of
Physicians
All Other Spending
 
Sources: National Practitioner Data Bank and Center for Medicare Studies 
 
Medical malpractice premiums also have made up no more than a sliver of total health 
care costs. They have ranged from 0.86 percent to 1.39 percent of costs. Their share was lower in 
the first five years of this decade than in the 1990s. 
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Figure 2: Direct Premiums Written as Percentage of Total Health Care 
Spending in New York
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Reform. 
 
Examination of medical malpractice data since 1991 – the earliest full year for which 
such information exists – reveals that the recent level of medical malpractice litigation in New 
York has been below normal or relatively normal, depending on the measure used.i The annual 
numbers of medical malpractice payments in New York were at historic lows in recent years and 
the inflation-adjusted amounts paid were only slightly higher over the past five years on a per 
capita basis and slightly lower on a per practicing physician basis. 
 
In 2006, New York had the fewest medical malpractice payments (including both 
settlements and judgments from court verdicts) per capita of any year since 1991. It also had the 
second fewest total payments. Each of the last five years has ranked in the bottom five out of the 
last 13 years in the number of payments per licensed physician. 
 
                                                 
i
 Medical malpractice payment statistics and some data on medical errors and doctor discipline in this report were 
drawn from the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), a federal repository of medical malpractice information 
created by Congress. 
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Figure 3: Number of Medical Malpractice Payments in New York 
Yearii 
Total Number of 
Payments 
(rank) 
Payments Per 100,000 
Residents 
(rank) 
Payments per 100,000 
Licensed Physicians 
Practicing In New York 
(rank) 
1991 1,706 (13) 9.4 (10) n/a 
1992 1,906 (6) 10.4 (t5) n/a 
1993 1,930 (5) 10.5 (t3) n/a 
1994 1,985 (3) 10.8 (1) 3,597 (2) 
1995 1,642 (16) 8.9 (16) 3,207 (7) 
1996 1,703 (14) 9.2 (t11) 3,189 (8) 
1997 1,767 (11) 9.5 (9) 3,308 (6) 
1998 1,888 (8) 10.1 (7) 3,437 (5) 
1999 1,978 (4) 10.5 (t3) 3,549 (3) 
2000 2,038 (1) 10.7 (2) 3,670 (1) 
2001 1,987 (2) 10.4 (t5) 3,486 (4) 
2002 1,773 (9) 9.2 (t11) 3,111 (10) 
2003 1,760 (12) 9.1 (15) 2,954 (11) 
2004 1,897 (7) 9.8 (8) 3,184 (9) 
2005 1,768 (10) 9.2 (t11) 2,787 (12) 
2006 1,702 (15) 8.8 (17) 2,748 (13) 
Avg. 1991-2001 1,866 10.0 3,430 
Avg. 2002-2006 1,780 9.2 2,957 
Sources: National Practitioner Data Bank, U.S. Census and the Federation of State Medical 
Boards. 
 
Meanwhile, the cumulative value medical malpractice payments, when adjusted for 
inflation and changes to the state’s population, rose only modestly. The average over the past 
five years was 3.6 percent higher than in the preceding 11 years. Inflation-adjusted average 
annual payments per practicing physician over the past five years were 3.2 percent lower than in 
the preceding 11 years. 
                                                 
ii
 NPDB offers several methods to calculate year of payment, including the year of judgment or settlement and the 
year in which a payment is recorded by NPDB. This analysis uses the year recorded because it is the most 
consistently available data. By law, reports must be made to NPDB within 30 days of payment. 
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Figure 4: Medical Malpractice Payments in New York Since 1991 
Year Total Value, Adjusted for Inflationiii 
Inflation-adjusted Value 
per 100,000 Residents 
(rank) 
Inflation-adjusted 
Value Per Licensed 
Physician Practicing in New 
York (rank) 
1991 $311,925,550 (16) $1,721,205 (16) n/a 
1992 $417,453,206 (7) $2,287,834 (6) n/a 
1993 $432,230,023 (5) $2,352,278 (3) n/a 
1994 $467,081,010 (2) $2,530,306 (1) $8,463 (1) 
1995 $327,481,583 (15) $1,767,867 (15) $6,397 (12) 
1996 $342,262,030 (14) $1,841,261 (14) $6,408 (11) 
1997 $359,558,464 (13) $1,927,251 (13) $6,732 (9) 
1998 $386,758,321 (12) $2,062,062 (11) $7,041 (8) 
1999 $404,211,283 (8) $2,140,641 (8) $7,252 (5) 
2000 $435,468,909 (4) $2,291,925 (5) $7,841 (3) 
2001 $442,419,162 (3) $2,316,864 (4) $7,762 (4) 
2002 $402,397,153 (10) $2,099,361 (9) $7,060 (7) 
2003 $430,277,779 (6) $2,236,574 (7) $7,221 (6) 
2004 $474,144,586 (1) $2,457,787 (2) $7,957 (2) 
2005 $398,161,551 (11) $2,061,334 (12) $6,277 (13) 
2006 $403,729,819 (9) $2,091,194 (10) $6,519 (10) 
Avg. Through 2001 $393,349,958 $2,112,681 $7,237 
Avg. 2002-2006 $421,742,178 $2,189,250 $7,007 
Sources: National Practitioner Data Bank, Federation of State Medical Boards, Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. 
Census. See Footnote iii for discussion of the inflation rate used. 
 
The New York State Unified Court System keeps track of the progress of medical 
malpractice cases filed across the state. It offers data on “Requests for Judicial Intervention” 
(descriptions of cases submitted to the court after the complaint and answer are filed) and “Notes 
of Issue” (a notice certifying that a case is ready for trial).  
 
The rate of both Requests for Judicial Intervention and Notes of Issue was about the same 
over the past five years as it was in the preceding six years (the time period for which such data 
are readily available).1 
                                                 
iii
 Figures adjusted to 1990 dollars. The inflation rate used in this report is a 60 percent/40 percent blend of the U.S. 
Medical Care Services rate and the Consumer Price Index. The Medical Care Services rate is particularly relevant 
because a significant portion of malpractice payments covers future medical costs. In the absence of a definitive 
study on future medical costs’ average share of malpractice payments, we used as a guideline a Physician Insurers 
Association of America (PIAA) statement in January 2007, which observed that reimbursement for other costs “such 
as lost wages, non-medical care, household expenses, pain and suffering and the claimant’s cost for attorney fees 
and courts costs” often are “40 percent or more of the total award.” 
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Overall, there was only slightly more than a 1 percent change in both indices over the 
past five years. Requests for Judicial Intervention were 1.4 percent higher over the past five 
years while Notes of Issue were 1.2 percent lower. 
 
Figure 5: Requests for Judicial Intervention 
in New York, 1996-2006 
 Figure 6: Notes of Issue in  
New York, 1996-2006 
Year 
Requests for Judicial 
Intervention per 100,000 
Residents 
(rank) 
 
Year 
Notes of Issue per 
100,000 Residents 
(rank) 
1996 23.7 (2)  1996 13.6 (10) 
1997 23.8 (1)  1997 13.4 (11) 
1998 22.8 (6)  1998 18.3 (2) 
1999 19.2 (11)  1999 15.9 (6) 
2000 21.2 (10)  2000 16.5 (5) 
2001 22.5 (7)  2001 18.8 (1) 
2002 22.9 (5)  2002 17.4 (3) 
2003 23.2 (3)  2003 16.7 (4) 
2004 23.0 (4)  2004 15.0 (8) 
2005 22.0 (8)  2005 15.0 (9) 
2006 21.4 (9)  2006 15.2 (7) 
Avg. 1996-2001 22.2  Avg. 1996-2001 16.1 
Avg. 2002-2006 22.5  Avg. 2002-2006 15.9 
Source: New York State Unified Court System Source: New York State Unified Court System 
     
 
Patient Outcomes in Cases Resulting in Malpractice Payments Tend To Be Severe 
 
In 2004, NPDB began collecting data on the severity of patient outcomes of cases that 
resulted in medical malpractice payments. The data lead to the following conclusions about 
medical malpractice payments in New York state: 
 
• Significant payments tend to be reserved, appropriately, for permanent injuries or 
death. The five categories that had the highest total amounts paid and the largest 
average payments all involved permanent injuries or death; 
 
• Deaths are the leading cause of medical malpractice payments in New York. Cases 
involving death had both the largest number of malpractice payments and the largest 
total amounts paid; and 
 
• The category involving a need for lifelong care (“quadriplegic, brain damage, lifelong 
care”) resulted in the highest average payments, although this category was fifth in 
total amounts paid. 
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Figure 7: Patient Outcomes in Cases Involving Medical Malpractice Payments, 2004-2006 
Outcome 
Total Value of 
Payments Paid 
(rank) 
Average Payment 
(rank) 
Number of Payments 
(rank) 
Death $480,133,750 (1) $398,121 (4) 1,206 (1) 
Significant Permanent Injury $452,170,000 (2) $497,437 (3) 909 (2) 
Major Permanent Injury $306,791,000 (3) $669,849 (2)  458 (6) 
Minor Permanent Injury $262,166,800 (4)  $309,890 (6) 846 (3) 
Quadriplegic, Brain Damage, 
Lifelong Care $256,511,250 (5) $872,487 (1) 294 (7) 
Major Temporary Injury $170,426,750 (6) $270,519 (7) 630 (5) 
Minor Temporary Injury $92,083,250 (7) $139,732 (8) 659 (4) 
Undetermined $30,115,600 (8) $386,097 (5) 78 (9) 
Insignificant Injury $6,520,550 (9) $77,626 (9) 84 (8) 
Emotional Injury Only $2,488,250 (10) $80,266 (10) 31 (10) 
Source: National Practitioner Data Bank 
 
 
Creating a New Fund for Neurologically Impaired of Infants Is Not the Answer 
 
The recent increase in medical malpractice premiums, combined with insurance 
companies’ claims of financial crisis, has resurrected an old and once-discarded idea: to establish 
a fund for neurologically impaired infants. Such a program, in theory, would pay these infants’ 
future medical costs at the cost of eviscerating their constitutional rights to seek redress in court.  
 
The need for such a radical policy shift is not grounded in any data. In fact, similar 
experiments in Florida and Virginia are marked failures. Virginia enacted its Birth-Related 
Neurological Injury Compensation Act in 1987. Florida followed Virginia’s lead the next year, 
passing the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (NICA) in 1988. It is 
noteworthy that over the ensuing twenty years and countless other “medical liability crises,” no 
other state has enacted similar legislation. 
 
Some key observations about these funds, and some applicable lessons are below: 
 
• These funds were not intended to provide fair compensation for brain damaged 
infants and their families; they were intended to cap the financial liability of 
negligent doctors. The funding of these programs is based on fixed assessments 
paid by doctors and hospitals. As a result, program administrators, by design, give 
a higher priority to maintaining the funds’ solvency levels than they do to 
publicizing the availability of compensation or paying the meager benefits 
provided to victims of negligence and their families. 
 
• While participation in the fund is voluntary on the part of physicians, it is 
involuntary for infants and their families. If a physician elects to participate, then 
patients and their families are bound by that decision and must accept the benefits 
made available by fund administrators. The Web site for the Virginia fund notes 
that a large percentage of births state-wide are notionally covered by the fund: 
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“participating physicians and hospitals provide Program coverage to more than 65 
percent of all births statewide and nearly 85 percent of births in Northern 
Virginia.”2 
 
• The single most notable attribute of these programs is their very small scale. It 
was predicted that Virginia would accept about 40 cases per year and Florida 
about 60. In fact, the Virginia program has accepted only 101 cases since 1988, an 
average of five per year.3 Florida has done slightly better (Florida has more than 
two times the number of births annually than Virginia does). NICA, the Florida 
program, accepted a total of 211 claims through 2006, an average of 11 per year.4 
 
• Even with this small claims load, and despite the fact that the stated purpose of 
these programs was intended to simplify and expedite the process, 93 percent of 
claimants in Florida use an attorney. The median time from injury to resolution in 
Florida is 899 days, or almost two-and-a-half years.5 
 
• Although the Virginia fund has been badly underutilized by the injured, its 
existence did, sadly, allow dangerous physicians to continue practicing. “Barred 
from being sued, doctors and hospitals were supposed to get close scrutiny from 
disciplinary boards in each of the birth-injury petitions. Not a single action has 
been brought against a doctor or a hospital,” wrote the Richmond Times-
Dispatch’s Bill McKelway, who has covered the fund’s travails for years.6 The 
existence of the fund, McKelway concludes, has removed any negative 
consequences for negligent behavior. 
 
• The promises that these programs made – that they would be a no-fault plan to 
cover injured infants and render determinations of fault unnecessary – have been 
broken in practice. Instead, the funds impose additional work on injured families 
to prove they are deserving of compensation. While a family does not technically 
have to prove negligence, almost all injuries that will meet the program’s 
eligibility requirements are, by definition, injuries that were actually caused by 
negligence at the time of delivery.7 For example, in Virginia, families must prove 
all of the following elements of a claim: 1) child delivered by a participating 
doctor or hospital; 2) child who suffered a birth-related neurological injury, as 
defined by Virginia law; 3) injury must have resulted from oxygen deprivation or 
mechanical injury during labor, delivery, immediate post delivery; 4) child must 
be permanently motorically disabled and developmentally disabled or cognitively 
disabled; 5) child must need assistance with all daily living activities. 
 
• There are significant damages that these funds never cover and that the child and 
family forfeit because they are unable to file a malpractice claim. For example, 
families are not compensated for the child’s pain, mental anguish, disfigurement, 
or loss of ability to enjoy life. In many cases, these damages are significant and 
describe very real losses in quality of life.  
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• Virginia and Florida were prompted to create these funds because of a specific 
actual and threatened withdrawal of liability coverage for physicians delivering 
babies.8 No similar danger exists today in New York. 
 
Data on New York medical malpractice cases maintained by the NPDB indicate that 
neurological injuries (which fall under the “Quadriplegic, Brain Damage, Lifelong Care” 
outcome category) yield among the highest average medical malpractice payments in New York, 
which is unsurprising because such cases incur extensive economic and non-economic costs.  
 
But payments for these injuries are in no way a major part of medical malpractice costs in 
New York. The “Quadriplegic, Brain Damage, Lifelong Care” category ranks halfway down the 
list – fifth – of ten outcome categories that show total amounts paid over the past three years (the 
years in which NPDB has tracked such data). That category of injuries ranks just below “Minor 
Permanent Injury” and just above “Major Temporary Injury.” Notably, payments for 
neurological injuries are only a subset of the category that also includes compensation for 
“Quadriplegic” and “Lifelong Care” injuries. 
 
The recent hike in medical liability premiums has nothing to do with patients’ litigation 
behavior. Instead, the need for the hike, as we show in Section II of this report, was caused by 
the state’s flawed rate setting and raid on its rainy day fund. The state should not consider 
proposals to provide immunity for negligent doctors and hospitals for some of the most serious 
injuries imaginable to New York’s youngest, most vulnerable and defenseless citizens: newborn 
babies. 
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II. New York Government Primarily Responsible for Insurance Problems 
 
Most of the blame for solvency issues claimed by the state’s medical malpractice insurers 
lies with the New York state government. 
 
During the 1990s, state officials left insurers in a precarious position by extracting $691 
million from the surplus of a program that provides insurance for doctors who are unable to 
obtain commercial policies. The state further jeopardized insurers by calling for any shortfalls in 
the insurance program for high-risk doctors (those unable to obtain commercial insurance) to be 
borne solely by medical malpractice insurers. Previously, that risk was spread across all 
providers of property-casualty insurance.9 
 
Meanwhile, state regulators kept annual insurance rate hikes stagnant for nearly a decade. 
As revenues from premiums lagged, insurers eventually had to dip into their reserves to cover 
claims for policies they issued. Additionally, insurers were required to absorb $525 million in 
losses between 2000 and March 2007 suffered by the program covering high-risk doctors.10  
 
Recent Hikes Were Preceded by a Long Period of Stagnant Rates 
 
Rate hikes in recent years largely made up for low rate increases throughout the latter 
half of the 1990s and early part of the current decade. From 1995 until 2003, medical malpractice 
insurance rates actually declined by an average of 1.4 percent per year. The average rate hike 
between 1991 and 2007 was only 3.5 percent, or slightly more than half of the overall U.S. 
medical inflation rate (6.5 percent). 
 
Figure 8: Approved Medical Malpractice 
 Insurance Rate Increases in New York, 1991-2008 
Policy Year % Change 
1991-92 -5.0 
1992-93 0.0 
1993-94 14.0 
1994-95 8.0 
1995-96 0.0 
1996-97 -10.0 
1997-98 0.1 
1998-99 0.0 
1999-00 0.2 
2000-01 -1.0 
2001-02 -0.8 
2002-03 0.0 
2003-04 8.5 
2004-05 7.0 
2005-06 7.0 
2006-07 9.0 
2007-08 14.0 
Average 3.5 
Source: N.Y. Department of Insurance 
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When the industry began to suffer losses, its woes had as much to do with declining 
revenue as increasing payments. Medical malpractice insurers in New York actually collected 
$23.1 million less in premiums in 1999 in actual dollars than they had five years earlier. 
 
Figure 9: Insurance Companies Premiums Received vs. 
Medical Malpractice Payments, 1991-2005 
Year N.Y. Premiums  
Direct 
Losses Paid 
Direct Losses 
Paid as a Pct. of 
Premiums 
Written 
1991 $793,879,724 $409,388,834 51.6 
1992 $811,974,970 $559,175,764 68.9 
1993 $870,300,422 $615,013,468 70.7 
1994 $923,163,546 $576,724,483 62.5 
1995 $905,070,538 $544,403,418 60.2 
1996 $822,075,016 $591,710,868 72.0 
1997 $816,663,055 $598,744,431 73.3 
1998 $886,935,822 $634,166,913 71.5 
1999 $900,034,082 $795,112,336 88.3 
2000 $849,687,717 $700,772,374 82.5 
2001 $881,194,813 $698,555,720 79.3 
2002 $992,924,544 $732,555,312 73.8 
2003 $1,107,374,159 $781,788,782 70.6 
2004 $1,284,228,574 $980,901,472 76.4 
2005 $1,372,467,390 $935,093,278 68.1 
Source: A.M. Best and Co., special data compilation for Americans 
for Insurance Reform. 
 
New York’s Disastrous Management of Pool for Risky Doctors Has Exacerbated Problems 
 
A great deal of the malpractice insurance companies’ financial troubles occurred 
because they were forced to cover losses borne by the Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Plan (MMIP), an insurance program for doctors who are unable to obtain conventional 
insurance. MMIP, which covers only about 1 percent of the state’s physicians, lost about 
$525 million between its inception in 2000 and March 2007. 
 
New York’s irresponsible management of the insurance program in the 1990s is why 
these losses accrued to insurance companies’ balance sheets, rather than being paid out of a 
reserve fund. Between 1992 and 1997, the state siphoned $691 million out of the program’s 
surplus fund. In 2000, the state altered the program. Insurance policies from the Medical 
Malpractice Insurance Association (MMIA) were transferred to the Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Plan (MMIP).11 And the new program required the state’s medical malpractice 
insurance providers to cover any losses suffered by the MMIP. (In contrast, if MMIA had 
suffered losses they would have been covered by all of the state’s property-casualty insurance 
providers.) 
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New York’s insurance superintendent and its insurance companies acknowledge that 
MMIP’s shortfall is largely responsible for the financial distress that the New York’s medical 
malpractice insurers are facing. “Had MMIA’s reserves been preserved and allowed to grow by 
collecting interest over the years instead of being so severely depleted, New York’s medical 
malpractice insurers would be in much stronger financial position today, and the problem facing 
New York would be far less serious,” New York State Insurance Superintendent Eric R. Dinallo 
said in a statement announcing the 14-percent rate hike for 2007.12 
 
Insurance companies have provided similar assessments to the Medical Malpractice 
Liability Task Force. 
 
• Donald J. Fager and Associates Inc., which manages both Medical Liability Mutual 
Insurance Company, or MLMIC (New York’s largest provider of medical malpractice 
insurance) and the MMIP, reported to the task force that the assumed deficits from 
the MMIP had “caused a significant drag on the surplus and financial condition” of 
the state’s malpractice insurance providers.13 
 
• “PRI has lost a significant amount of its surplus due to the mandated MMIP pool 
losses and requests for rate increases which were not fully granted,” another carrier, 
Physicians Reciprocal Insurers (PRI), wrote in a submission to the task force.14 
 
• “The principal driver that has detracted from Academic’s financial status is the 
MMIP,” provider Academic Health Providers Insurance Association wrote in a 
different submission.15 
 
John DeLosh, who manages MMIP on behalf of Medical Liability Mutual Insurance 
Company, told Public Citizen, “we’d be sitting pretty” if the money removed from the fund in 
the 1990s were replaced.16 
 
DeLosh explained that MMIP also has suffered from several other handicaps: 
 
• MMIP inherited insurance policies from MMIA that did not properly reflect the 
specialties or levels of risk of the doctors covered. For example, DeLosh said, some 
full-time obstetricians were classified in less-expensive categories. Other doctors 
were not being charged rates that accurately reflected the extent of risks they posed. 
These mistakes went unnoticed in the 1990s, when the insurance industry was doing 
well. But they became significant problems in the early part of this decade, when 
investment income dropped and claims increased.17 
 
DeLosh said that MMIP has since corrected this problem by changing doctors’ 
classifications and applying surcharges it may impose on doctors with high claims’ 
histories. This has resulted in some doctors shifting from high-risk specialties for 
which they were ill-suited to less risky specialties, he said. MMIP also benefited from 
steady annual rate increase approvals from the state that increased baseline premiums 
paid by participating doctors from 125 percent of commercial rates to 292 percent of 
commercial rates.18 
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“We think our present book of business is in a lot better shape,” DeLosh told 
Public Citizen. 19 
 
In fact, a KPMG audit released in September showed that the MMIP turned a 
$6.1 million profit for the year ending June 30, 2006.20 
 
• New York, which picks up the tab for what is known as “first layer excess insurance” 
for doctors who carry $1.3 million in primary insurance, set rates for this type of 
coverage too low to cover costs. (“First-layer excess insurance” provides $1 million 
in additional coverage for claims that exceed a New York physician’s primary 
insurance policy.) The low rates set by the state prompted commercial insurers to 
abandon the “first-layer excess” market, resulting in a flood of physicians statewide 
turning to MMIP for their first-layer coverage. The number of first-layer excess 
policies provided by MMIP jumped from 292 in 2002 to 13,743 in 2004.21 (The 
figure receded to 677 by mid-2007). Between 2000 and mid-2007, MMIP collected 
$101 million in first-layer excess premiums, for which it anticipates paying out $209 
million in total claims.22 
 
MMIP’s problems in the first-layer excess market were exacerbated, according to 
DeLosh, because the state has postponed paying its share of the premiums for as long 
as four years. “So we lost all that investment income,” DeLosh said.23 
 
MMIP’s ratio of losses paid to premiums collected between 2000 and mid-2007 was 191 
percent.24 In contrast, the worst ratio for commercial insurers in any year since 1991 was 88 
percent, in 1999. The commercial insurers’ ratio was 61 percent in 2005.25 (These figures do not 
include overhead or other expenses.) 
 
Figure 10: MMIP’s Premiums Received vs. Medical Malpractice Payments, 2000 Through Mid-2007 
Type of Coverage Offered 
# of Practitioners 
Covered 
(in 2007) 
Premiums Collected 
(in millions) 
Losses 
(in millions)* 
Physicians (Primary)  510 $210 $332 
First-layer Excess 677 $101 $209 
Facilities n/a $79 $184 
Second-layer Excess n/a $8 $14 
Podiatrists 70 $7 $17 
Dentists 216 $6 $33 
Nurse Midwives 22 $1 $3 
Source: MMIP 
* Includes both payments already made and predicted losses. 
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Insurance Markets Are Generally Cyclical 
 
New York’s medical malpractice insurance market differs from those in other states 
because the state regulates annual rate increases. Nonetheless, the state has experienced many of 
the hallmarks of cyclical volatility in its insurance market. As Tom Baker noted in The Medical 
Malpractice Myth, “the insurance industry goes through a boom-and-bust cycle that creates 
medical malpractice insurance crises like the past one. Lawyers, judges, and juries have little or 
nothing to do with it.”26  
 
The property-casualty insurance industry readily acknowledges that its premiums result 
from market-driven cyclical shifts that are somewhat unrelated to claims. The Insurance 
Information Institute provides the following explanation of the cyclical nature of the property-
casualty market (which includes medical malpractice insurance) on its Web site:  
 
A dominant factor in the [property-casualty] insurance cycle is intense 
competition within the industry. Premium rates drop as insurance companies 
compete vigorously to increase market share. As the market softens to the point 
that profits diminish or vanish completely, the capital needed to underwrite new 
business is depleted. In the up phase of the cycle, competition is less intense, 
underwriting standards become more stringent, the supply of insurance is limited 
due to the depletion of capital and, as a result, premiums rise. The prospect of 
higher profits draws more capital into the marketplace leading to more 
competition and the inevitable down phase of the cycle.27 
 
In addition to these predictable but erratic market fluctuations, some of the increases in 
medical malpractice premiums, nationally, in 2001 through 2003 were likely caused, at least in 
part, by insurance companies’ declining investment income. In submissions to the Medical 
Malpractice Liability Task Force, New York’s companies point to declining investment income 
as contributing to their problems. One company noted, “investment returns for most insurance 
companies have decreased over time as a reflection of a long, historic low interest rate 
environment in the U.S.”28  
 
Medical malpractice premiums, nationally, appear likely to remain relatively stable in 
coming years because of the recent run-up in rates. “The financial results of medical malpractice 
insurers show the crisis in medical malpractice insurance in most states is lessening as premiums 
reach acceptable levels relative to costs,” the Insurance Information Institute wrote in September 
2007.29 
 
New York’s recent rate insurance shifts likely are out of sync with national trends 
because their rates are regulated by the state. New York’s rates lagged behind national rate 
increases, which peaked in 2005 and have leveled off since then.30 
  
Public Citizen’s Congress Watch 19 A Self-Inflicted “Crisis” 
 
III. Receiving Health Care in New York Is Unsafe 
 
Although the state’s need to play catch-up for nearly a decade of below-inflation rate 
increases is a primary reason for the recent run-up in rates, reducing the number of malpractice 
incidents would likely help lessen the effects of future cyclical jumps in premiums. And 
regardless of its favorable effect on premiums, improving patient safety for the residents of New 
York should be a top priority for the state’s health care system for moral and ethical reasons. The 
data indicate that there truly is a patient safety emergency in the state of New York. 
 
The available information on patient safety leads to two fundamental conclusions:  
 
1.  Improvements in patient safety will reduce malpractice claims in the long view (even 
if no immediate insurance rate reductions result); and  
 
2. New York must take definitive steps now to improve its patient safety record. Far too 
many medical errors occur in New York.  
 
The risk-management and reinsurance company, Aon, recently released a national study 
concluding that, nationally, medical malpractice hospital claims and the rate of increase in claim 
severity are at their lowest levels in eight years. Significantly, Aon concluded that “the nation’s 
best hospitals, those recognized for their patient safety environments, exhibit significantly lower 
liability costs compared to national averages.” Aon also found that “patient safety initiatives 
aimed at obstetrics and emergency departments are linked to reductions in the number of claims 
in those areas.”31 
 
The topic of medical error has been the focus of at least some attention over the past 
decade. In 1999, the Institute of Medicine of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences released a 
landmark report, To Err is Human. The report concluded that medical errors kill as many as 
98,000 people in the United States every year, and called on medical providers and institutions to 
cut such mistakes in half in the ensuing five years.32 
 
In January 2000, New York State Health Commissioner Antonia Novello pledged to meet 
the Institute of Medicine’s goal of a 50 percent reduction in hospitals’ medical errors within five 
years.33 Seven years later, there is no evidence that such progress has been made. 
 
We analyzed the incidence of easily preventable errors recorded in both the NPDB and in 
New York’s Patient Occurrence Reporting and Tracking System (NYPORTS), a state system 
that tracks “unintended adverse or undesirable developments in an individual patient’s condition 
occurring in a hospital.”34 We also cross-referenced the NYPORTS data with a recently issued 
set of adverse incidents – categorized by the federal government as “never events” because they 
should never happen – for which Medicare recently announced it will no longer provide 
reimbursement.  
 
The data suggest that New York is failing to make significant headway in reducing 
avoidable errors, and may in fact be experiencing an increase in such errors. 
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The NBDB data indicate that while certain easily avoidable errors became less common 
in recent years, other grave errors increased, such as procedures on the “wrong patient.” In 2006, 
New York saw a spate of payments for “wrong medication administered” and “wrong 
medication ordered.” Other error categories – such as the number of payments for “surgical or 
other foreign body retained” and procedures on the “wrong body part” – remained unacceptably 
high in recent years, although their incidence today is somewhat below the unconscionably high 
levels that occurred between 1991 and 1999. 
 
Figure 11: Easily Preventable Errors Resulting in Medical Malpractice  
Payments by NY Doctors 
Allegation Average, 1991-1999 
Average, 
2000-2006 2006 
Surgical or Other Foreign Body Retained 29.8 18.4 19 
Wrong Medication Administered 1.6 2.1 8 
Wrong Medication Ordered 4.2 2.7 7 
Wrong Body Part 8.9 4.9 6 
Wrong Procedure or Treatment 9.8 3.7 3 
Wrong Patient 0.0 0.9 2 
Failure to Use Aseptic Technique 0.7 7.0 0 
Wrong Blood Type 0.2 0.1 0 
Source: National Practitioner Data Bank 
 
Figure 12: Number and Cost of Easily Preventable Errors
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The NPDB does not attempt to track all adverse event in hospitals. Rather, the database 
merely logs the small share of incidents that result in medical malpractice payments. The more 
comprehensive NYPORTS statistics are intended to include all adverse incidents. 
 
Adverse incidents are not synonymous with errors but many leave little room for any 
other conclusion. For instance, many NYPORTS codes are similar, though not identical, to 
Medicare’s newly identified “Never Events” – events for which Medicare will soon refuse to 
pay, and for which hospitals will not be allowed to charge Medicare patients.35  
 
New York’s comptroller has characterized the NYPORTS data as incomplete. Still, the 
NYPORTS statistics present a far more disconcerting picture than the NPDB numbers. 
NYPORTS data show that inexcusable errors are shockingly common. The categories include 
serious errors such as “incorrect procedure or treatment – invasive” (which occurred 92.3 times 
per year since 1999, including 96 in 2005); “unintentionally retained foreign body” (92.3 per 
year; 90 in 2005); and “wrong patient, wrong site – surgical procedure” (22.6 per year; 19 in 
2005).36 
 
The data also indicate a shocking number of deaths occurring due to adverse incidents in 
hospitals. Between 1999 and 2005, an average of 555.3 deaths per year were reported in New 
York. That figure rose to 676 in 2005. Although these adverse incidents did not necessarily 
constitute errors, some undoubtedly did, and they warrant study. 
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Figure 13: Adverse Incidents Reported to NYPORTS, 1999-2005 
NYPORTS Code Definition Medicare “Never Events” 
Average 
1999-
2005 
2005 
Death (e.g. brain death)  555.3 676 
Serious occurrence warranting DOH notification (not 
covered by [certain other codes] 
 350.0 452 
Malfunction Of Equipment during treatment or diagnosis, 
or a defective product Resulting In Death Or Serious 
Injury 
 
330.3 413 
Specific AMBULANCE Transfers to the hospital from an 
Article 28 diagnostic and treatment center, in 
circumstances other than those related to the natural 
course of illness, disease or proper treatment in 
accordance with generally accepted medical standards 
 
156.3 246 
Termination Of Any Services Vital To The Continued Safe 
Operation Of The Hospital Or To The Health And Safety 
Of Its Patients And Personnel, including but not limited to 
the anticipated or actual termination of telephone, 
electric, gas, fuel, water, heat, air conditioning, rodent or 
pest control, laundry services, food or contract services. 
 
268.4 215 
Impairment Of Limb, Organ or Body Functions. (limb, 
organ body function unable to function at same level prior 
to occurrence). In circumstances other than those related 
to the natural course of illness, disease or proper 
treatment (e.g., delay in treatment, diagnoses or an 
omission of care) in accordance with generally accepted 
medical standards. 
 
96.4 212 
Cardiac And/Or Respiratory Arrest Requiring ACLS 
Intervention. 
 101.6 103 
Incorrect Procedure or Treatment - Invasive Wrong surgical procedure on 
a patient 92.3 96 
Unintentionally Retained Foreign Body (e.g., sponges, lap 
pads, instruments, guidewires from central line insertion, 
cut intravascular cannulas, needles) 
Retention of a foreign object 
in a patient after surgery or 
other procedure 
92.3 90 
Any unexpected adverse occurrence not directly related 
to the natural course of the patient’s illness or underlying 
condition resulting in loss or impairment of bodily 
functions. 
 
106.9 56 
Misadministration Of Radiation or Radioactive Material  32.6 55 
Loss Of limb Or Organ. In circumstances other than those 
related to the natural course of illness, disease or proper 
treatment (e.g., delay in treatment, diagnoses or an 
omission of care) in accordance with generally accepted 
medical standards 
 
30.4 38 
Errors of omission resulting in death or serious injury 
related to the patient’s underlying condition. 
 71.4 35 
Hospital/Center Fire or other internal disaster disrupting 
patient care or causing harm to patients or staff. 
 32.0 29 
Wrong Patient, Wrong Site Surgical Procedure Surgery performed on the 
wrong body part 
Surgery performed on the 
wrong patient 
22.6 19 
Suicides And Attempted Suicides Related To An Inpatient 
Hospitalization, With Serious Injury. 
Patient suicide, or attempted 
suicide resulting in serious 
disability, while being cared 
32.1 12 
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NYPORTS Code Definition Medicare “Never Events” 
Average 
1999-
2005 
2005 
for in a health care facility 
Elopement from hospital leading to death/serious injury Patient death or serious 
disability associated with 
patient elopement 
(disappearance) for more 
than four hours 
6.3 8 
Poisoning Occurring Within The Hospital (water, air, and 
food). 
 3.6 2 
Rape Of A Patient. (Includes alleged rape with clinical 
confirmation). 
Sexual assault on a patient 
within or on the grounds of a 
health care facility 
4.0 2 
Crime Resulting In Death Or Serious Injury. Death or significant injury of a 
patient or staff member 
resulting from a physical 
assault (i.e., battery) that 
occurs within or on the 
grounds of a health care 
facility 
Any instance of care ordered 
by or provided by someone 
impersonating a physician, 
nurse, pharmacist, or other 
licensed health care provider 
Abduction of a patient of any 
age 
2.9 1 
Infant Abduction. Patient death or serious 
disability associated with the 
use of contaminated drugs, 
devices, or biologics provided 
by the health care facility 
1.3 1 
Infant Discharged To Wrong Family. Infant discharged to the 
wrong person 0.1 0 
Sources: State of New York Department of Health – New York Patient Occurrence Reporting and Tracking System 
Report 2002-2004 (Available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/hospital/nyports/annual_report/2002-
2004/docs/2002-2004_nyports_annual_report.pdf), State of New York Department of Health, and Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services. 
 
New York Hospitals Score Abysmally in National Rankings 
 
An October 2007 report by Health Grades Inc., a company that measures health care 
safety, found that only 2.1 percent of New York’s hospitals ranked among the top 15 percent 
nationally while a stunning 47 percent ranked among the bottom 15 percent nationally.37 The 
same group in April 2006 ranked New York’s patient-safety performance 49th out of 50 states.38 
 
New York’s Record of Disciplining Bad Doctors Is Shameful 
 
Medical malpractice incidents tend to be concentrated among a small percentage of 
doctors. Typically, only a small percentage of those doctors receive any sort of disciplinary 
action, and New York is no exception to this sad general state of affairs. 
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Between September 1990 and December 2006, 6,186 New York doctors made two or 
more malpractice payments. For comparison purposes, that figure represents only 7.7 percent of 
the 80,681 licensed physicians in New York in the first half of 2007, and probably far less than 
7.7 percent of doctors practicing in the time period. (New York almost certainly had significantly 
more than 80,681 licensed physicians since 1990 because the 2007 data represent only a 
snapshot in time.) But that small share of doctors was responsible for a whopping 71 percent of 
dollars paid out for medical malpractice in the time period. Barely one-in-twelve (8.5 percent) of 
physicians with two or more payments has experienced any license-related disciplinary actions 
by the state. 
 
Just 3,052 physicians made three or more malpractice payments in the time-frame 
studied. Yet these physicians, who represent no more than 4 percent of the state’s doctors in the 
time period and likely significantly less than that, have been responsible for nearly half (49.6 
percent) of dollars paid for malpractice incidents since 1991. Of these doctors, only 10.8 percent 
have received licensure actions. 
 
Even more troubling is the fact that less than a third (31.5 percent) of the doctors who 
made ten or more payments have had a reportable licensure disciplinary action.iv 
 
Figure 14: Rate of Discipline Among Doctors Who Have Made Medical Malpractice Payments  
Number of 
Payment 
Reports 
Number of 
Doctors Who 
Made Payments 
Sum of These 
Payments 
Subset of 
Number of 
Doctors who 
had One or 
More 
Reportable 
Licensure 
Actions 
Pct. of Doctors 
Who Made 
Payments 
Who had One or 
More 
Reportable 
Licensure 
Actions 
Pct. of Total 
Dollars Paid 
Out Statewide 
Total 15,624 $8,801,597,900 920 5.9 100.0 
1 9,435 $2,547,679,350 393 4.2 28.9 
2 or more 6,189 $6,253,918,550 527 8.5 71.1 
3 or more 3,057 $4,369,937,700 332 10.9 49.6 
4 or more 1,631 $3,032,795,700 213 13.1 34.5 
5 or more 960 $2,173,580,200 141 14.7 24.7 
10 or more 127 $482,470,250 40 31.5 5.5 
Source: National Practitioner Data Bank 
 
Below we provide brief profiles of several doctors who made at least five medical 
malpractice payments and yet had no licensure actions taken against them: 
 
• Physician number 59877 made 14 payments totaling $10.6 million between 1994 and 
2005. These included three obstetrics payments totaling $2.7 million for “failure to 
monitor” and a $325,000 surgery-related payment for “wrong body part.” 
 
                                                 
iv
 A June 2007 Public Citizen report ranked New York 17th among the 50 states and the District of Columbia in its 
rate of taking disciplinary action against its doctors. The state should not take solace in its relatively high ranking, 
however, as it mostly results from the sad state of medical oversight nationally.  
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• Physician number 27991 made 12 payments totaling $9.8 million between 1994 and 
2006. These included nine obstetrics payments totaling $8.8 million. 
 
• Physician number 226332 made 72 payments in 2005 alone, totaling $8.9 million. 
Each one of these was for “improper technique” during anesthesia. 
 
• Physician number 24831 made eight payments totaling $8.7 million from 1993 to 
2006. Six of the eight were for surgery-related incidents, including one payment for 
over $3.9 million. 
 
• Physician number 118288 made nine payments totaling $8.1 million between 1998 
and 2005. Five of the payments were obstetrics-related. In 2003, the physician made a 
$1.9 million payment for “improperly performed c-section.” 
 
• Physician number 25575 made nine payments totaling $8 million between 1992 and 
2005. All but one of the payments was obstetrics-related. The physician made five 
payments for $4.3 million for “improper performance,” and one payment of $995,000 
for “improper choice of delivery method.” 
 
• Physician number 24027 made five payments between 1994 and 2004, totaling $7.8 
million, including 2 payments for “improper choice of delivery method” and one 
payment of $5.3 million for “delay in performance.” 
 
• Physician number 164130 made eight payments in 2003 and 2005, totaling $7.7 
million, all for “improper performance” during surgery. 
 
• Physician number 25009 made 15 payments between 1992 and 2005, totaling $7.3 
million, including 6 for surgery and six for diagnosis-related incidents. 
 
New York Comptroller Calls for Improved Physician Oversight 
 
In August of this year, the New York State Comptroller released a scathing report 
identifying several shortcomings in the physician-oversight responsibilities of the Department of 
Health’s Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC). Among his findings were the 
following: 
 
1.  OPMC has not adhered to its very minimal criteria for investigating physicians. 
OPMC’s policy is to investigate physicians involved in medical malpractices cases 
whenever:  
 
• The settlement amount is greater than $500,000; 
• There is a judgment against the licensee; or 
• There is a death of a mother or child during childbirth.39 
 
But auditors found hundreds of instances in which OPMC either failed to satisfy these 
criteria or is in jeopardy of failing to do so. Auditors found 177 medical malpractice 
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cases – mostly reported in the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) – that should 
have triggered an OPMC investigation but which the agency failed to investigate.40 
Auditors found an additional 154 cases in New York’s Office of Court 
Administration system that the OPMC should have been tracking, but was not.41  
 
2. OPMC should expand the medical malpractice criteria it uses to initiate 
investigations. Several other states with physician populations comparable to New 
York’s investigate all of the doctors who are named in a particular number of lawsuits 
within a certain time span – most commonly, three cases within five years. Auditors 
found twelve physicians with three or more medical malpractice cases filed against 
them in the past three years. Three of the twelve were not investigated by OPMC.42  
 
3.  OPMC has failed to adequately collect information from other agencies that it is 
supposed to use to monitor physicians.43 Auditors found that OPMC’s information-
sharing with other agencies is generally poor and, in some cases, non-existent. 
Auditors “identified instances where OPMC does not receive complaints from outside 
reporting entities, including instances involving potential fraud on the part of the 
licensee.”44 For instance, Medicare and Medicaid maintain lists of physicians whose 
actions have resulted in their suspension from the programs. Yet OPMC does not use 
these lists, and there are physicians on them whom OPMC has not investigated. 
 
4.  OPMC should begin to proactively identify potential incidents of medical 
misconduct. Currently, OPMC begins investigations of doctors only in response to 
passively collected information, including consumer complaints, information from the 
legal system, insurance reports, news reports, and information from other state and 
professional organizations. Auditors recommended that OPMC seize the initiative and 
seek out incidents of medical misconduct that are not publicized through other means. 
 
5.  OPMC must complete its investigations in a more timely manner. The auditors 
recommended instituting a formalized time standard to differentiate between cases 
that are moving too slowly and cases that take a long time as a result of their 
complexity. Often, OPMC investigations last longer than twelve months. For 
example, OPMC’s New Rochelle office took more than a year to conduct each of 113 
investigations during the time of the audit, representing 39 percent of its caseload.45 
When investigations move this slowly, “the public is at risk of receiving substandard 
medical care,” auditors said.46 Much of the problem stems from OPMC’s insufficient 
and uneven funding; the Rochester field office closes its average case in 194 days, 
and the average full-time investigator manages 36 cases. In contrast, the New 
Rochelle field office closes its average case in 327 days, and its investigators carry an 
average of 60 cases each. 
 
The state’s negligent oversight was illustrated recently when it was discovered that health 
officials delayed notifying more than 600 people that they had potentially been exposed to 
deadly diseases by a single physician improperly reusing syringes. The state regards its 
investigation into the physician, Dr. Harvey Finkelstein, as “non-disciplinary.”47 
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V. New York’s Supply of Physicians Is Flourishing 
 
The announcement in July 2007 of a 14-percent increase in medical malpractice 
premiums prompted a new wave of declarations that New York was facing a doctor-shortage 
crisis: 
 
• “The impact of these rate hikes is tremendous .... We’re seeing many Obs who aren’t 
willing to stay in practice because they just can’t afford it,” members of the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists said.48 
 
• “The 14-percent increase in physician medical liability insurance premiums 
announced today will severely worsen the health care access crisis that has already 
resulted in shortages in several specialties all across New York state,” wrote a 
representative from the Medical Society of the State of New York.49 
  
• “I am concerned that the increasing cost of medical liability insurance will drive some 
physicians out of the field and will discourage young people from entering the 
medical profession in the first place,” state Health Commissioner Richard Daines 
said.50 
 
But numerous facts belie the claim that New York is facing a doctor shortage. In fact, 
New York’s supply of doctors is growing and is the healthiest it has been in at least a decade. 
Such a reality is particularly meaningful in New York because it already has one of the largest 
populations of physicians of any state. In 2005, New York had 339 patient care physicians per 
100,000 people, almost 50 percent more than national rate of 239 per 100,000 people. Just two 
other states – Massachusetts and Maryland – as well as the District of Columbia, boast higher 
physician/population ratios.51 
 
The health of New York’s physician population extends to its population of specialists. 
The numbers of doctors in specializations often regarded as “at risk” by medical malpractice 
crisis proponents have, in most cases, risen even faster than the state’s overall population of 
physicians. Even the specialty of obstetrics, which is routinely said to be suffering from 
shortages, boasts more physicians per birth in New York today than in 2000, before the alleged 
“crisis” began.  
 
We used several data sources to evaluate the population of New York physicians. 
Although the data sources employ different methodologies and, therefore, yield some disparate 
results, they invariably point to upward trends in the availability of doctors, including specialists. 
Sources consulted were: 
 
• The New York State Education Department (NYSED), which issues licenses to 
physicians and publishes aggregated statistics. 
 
• The Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), which publishes statistics on the 
number of physicians practicing in-state as part of its yearly report. 
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• The Center for Health Workforce Studies (CHWS) at the University of Albany 
School of Public Health, which has used survey responses to calculate the number of 
active physicians by specialty area for each year from 2001 to 2005. (2006 data is not 
yet available). 
 
• The American Board of Medical Specialties, which annually reports the number of 
physicians who are board certified, by specialty and state, providing insight into shifts 
in populations of specialists. 
The Number of Licensed Physicians in New York Has Been on the Rise 
 
From 1995 to 2007, the number of physicians licensed by the New York State Education 
Department rose from 66,817 to 80,681. This represented a 20.7 percent increase in the actual 
number of physicians and a 15.8 percent increase in the number of physicians per 100,000 New 
Yorkers. Between 2000 (before New York’s alleged medical malpractice insurance crisis began) 
and 2007, the total number of physicians in the state increased 11.6 percent, or 9.8 percent when 
adjusted for the state’s population. 
 
Figure 15: Number of Licensed Physicians in New York, 1995-2006 
Year 
Number of 
Licensed 
Physicians 
Change in Number 
Physicians over 
Previous Year 
Physicians per 
100,000 Residents 
Change in number 
of Physicians per 
100,000 Residents 
over Previous Year 
1995 66,817 
- 
360.7 - 
1996 68,273 +1,456 367.3 +6.6 
1997 68,827 +554 368.9 +1.6 
1998 70,180 +1,353 374.2 +5.3 
1999 71,259 +1,079 377.4 +3.2 
2000 72,290 +1,031 380.5 +3.1 
2001 72,816 +526 381.3 +0.8 
2002 74,063 +1,247 386.4 +5.1 
2003 75,117 +1,054 390.5 +4.1 
2004 76,843 +1,726 398.3 +7.8 
2005 78,306 +1,463 405.4 +7.1 
2007 80,681 +2,375 417.9 +12.5 
Source: New York State Education Department and U.S. Census. 
* 2007 figures are for first half of the year. All other figures reported (except for 1996) are for second half of the year. 
Public Citizen was unable to obtain 2006 data from the New York State Education Department. 
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The Number of Practicing Physicians in New York Has Risen Markedly 
 
Some doctor-shortage claims hinge on alleged shortages of practicing physicians (rather 
than licensed physicians). But, New York saw a 16-percent increase in practicing physicians 
between 1996 and 2006, or an 11.7 percent increase when analyzed on a per capita basis. 
 
 
Figure 16: Number of Practicing Physicians in New York, 1996-2006 
Year 
Total Number of 
Licensed 
Physicians 
Practicing In-State 
Change in 
Physicians over 
Previous Year 
Physicians per 
100,000 Residents 
Change in Number 
of Physicians per 
100,000 Residents 
over Previous Year 
1994 55,189 -- 299.0 -- 
1995 51,193 -3,996 276.4 -22.6 
1996 53,409 2,216 287.3 11.0 
1997 53,409 0 286.3 -1.0 
1998 54,926 +1,517 292.8 6.6 
1999 55,732 +806 295.1 2.3 
2000 55,531 -201 292.3 -2.9 
2001 56,995 +1,464 298.5 6.2 
2002 56,995 0 297.4 -1.1 
2003 59,581 +2,586 309.7 12.3 
2004 59,581 0 308.8 -0.9 
2005 63,427 +3,846 328.4 19.5 
2006 61,931 -1,496 320.8 -7.6 
Source: Federation of State Medical Boards and U.S. Census 
 
The Number of Full-Time Equivalent Physicians in New York Has Risen Markedly 
 
Some doctor-shortage claims have focused on alleged reductions in the hours worked by 
doctors, leading to a conclusion that doctor availability is lessened even if the total number of 
doctors is the same or higher. But the best available evidence contradicts this claim. 
 
The Center for Health Workforce Studies found that the number of active patient care 
physicians increased by 3,752 and the number of full-time equivalents (FTE’s) increased 3,044. 
52
 
 
Both the per capita number of physicians in active care and the per capita number of full-
time-equivalent physicians in active care increased 5 percent between 2001 and 2005. 
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Figure 16: Full-Time Equivalent Physicians in Active Care 2001-2005 
Specialty Group* Total FTEs Change in Number of FTEs 
FTEs Per 100k 
People 
Percentage 
Change in FTEs 
Per capita 
Primary Care 16,379 1,013 85 +6% 
Specialists (Total) 38,062 2,468 197 +6% 
IM 7,349 780 38 +11% 
GS 1,427 -224 7 -14% 
Surgery Specialists 6,612 175 34 +2% 
Facility Based 7,777 983 40 +13% 
Psychiatry 4,948 1 26 -1% 
Total Physicians in 
Active Care 
55,390 3,044 287 +5% 
Source: Center for Health Workforce Studies 
* Other physician specialties are not displayed but are included in the specialists total. 
* Table excludes Ob-Gyns, which are discussed in more detail below. 
 
The Number of Obstetricians in New York Is Keeping Pace with the Population 
 
The Center for Health Workforce Studies reports that New York experienced a modest 
(2.8 percent) decline in the number of Ob-Gyns between 2000 and 2005. CHWS’s research on 
the subject is particularly relevant because the Center distinguishes between Ob-Gyns who 
practice only gynecology and those who also practice obstetrics. 
 
In April 2006, the Center issued a report on trends regarding the numbers of practicing 
Ob-Gyns. While groups that seek to portray the state’s availability of doctors as a crisis seized on 
the Center’s report of a modest decline in Ob-Gyns as evidence to buttress their argument, they 
ignored a major caveat. The Center concluded that “demographic changes appear to be 
contributing to a reduction in demand for some obstetrical services in New York.”  
 
According to the Center’s data, which is obtained by surveys and is subject to some 
margin of error, the number of obstetricians in relation to women of childbearing age (CBA) in 
the state fell by only 0.7 percent between 2000 and 2005, and the number of obstetricians in 
relation to the state’s birthrate grew by 2.4 percent. 
 
Figure 17: Practicing Obstetricians, 2000-2005 
Year Practicing Obs. 
Obs. Per 
100,000 
Women of CBA 
Obs. Per 
100,000 Births 
2000 2,368 56.2 916.2 
2004 2,275 54.8 913.7 
2005 2,302 55.8 938.1 
Pct. Change: 
2000-2005 -2.8% -0.7% 2.4% 
Source: Center for Health Workforce Studies, U.S. Census, New York State  
Department of Health 
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The Number of Specialists in New York Is Increasing 
 
Medical malpractice crisis mongers often claim shortages of desirable medical 
specialists. But this argument does not bear fruit either. The number of practicing physicians in 
New York in four specializations often deemed “at risk” because of insurance rate increases – 
anesthesiology, emergency medicine, internal medicine and neurosurgery – all increased by 
more than 50 percent since 1996. (Emergency medicine specialists have more than doubled.) 
Meanwhile, the number of surgeons went up by 19.6 percent.  
 
The population of practitioners of each specialty per capita also increased substantially. 
Per capita increases ranged from 15.2 percent for surgeons to 102.4 percent for emergency 
medicine specialists.  
 
Figure 18: Actual Number of Physicians in ‘At-Risk’ Specialties, 1996-2006* 
Year 
Anesthesiologists 
per 100,000 
Residents 
Emergency 
Medicine 
Specialists 
per 100,000 
Residents 
Internal 
Medicine 
Specialists 
per 
100,000 
Residents 
Neurosurgeons 
per 100,000 
Residents 
Surgeons 
per 
100,000 
Residents 
1996 9.7 3.6 64.1 1.1 13.8 
1997 10.5 4.0 68.2 1.1 14.0 
1998 11.0 4.4 74.1 1.2 14.1 
1999 11.6 4.7 78.4 1.9** 14.3 
2000 12.1 5.0 82.2 1.2 14.5 
2001 12.5 5.3 86.4 1.3 14.6 
2002 12.7 5.7 90.7 1.3 14.8 
2003 13.5 5.9 94.8 1.5 15.1 
2004 13.3 6.3 92.3 1.5 14.8 
2005 13.7 6.7 93.5 1.5 14.9 
2006 14.1 7.3 93.5 1.6 15.9 
Pct. 
Change: 
1996-
2006 
+45.1% +102.4% +45.9% +46.3% +15.2% 
Source: American Board of Medical Specialties, U.S.Census 
* Excludes Ob-Gyns, which are discussed above. 
** Number is highly aberrational and may be incorrect. 
 
 
New York Is Training More Doctors than any Other State 
 
A recent article in the Journal of the American Medical Association raved over New 
York’s success in training doctors. “With over 15,000 residents and fellows training in more than 
1,100 programs in the state, New York is, by far, the nation’s leader in graduate medical 
education. Its nearest competitor, California, has fewer than 60 percent as many residents and 
fellows in training.”53 
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Figure 19: Residents and Fellows on Duty December 1, 2006 
State Residents/Fellows 
New York 15,548 
California 9,088 
Pennsylvania 7,110 
Texas 6,633 
Illinois 5,781 
Source: Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 298 No. 4, July 25, 
2007, p. 1088-1089. 
 
 
Key Finding: Malpractice Insurance Increases Do Not Decrease the Number of Doctors 
 
Alleged doctor-shortage crises resulting from hikes in malpractice insurance rates crop up in 
fairly predictable cycles. Consider the following claim of the New York chapter of the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), as reported in the New York 
Times: “Nearly 10 percent of the state’s approximately 2,000 obstetricians are abandoning 
baby delivery each year, converting their practices to gynecology or general medicine. The 
effect on prenatal care in the state has been compounded, many obstetricians say, by a 
tendency of doctors who remain in the field to avoid treating women whom they consider high 
risks.”54 
 
Although this ACOG message sounds strikingly familiar to alarms the group sounded in the 
summer of 2007, it is, in fact, from 1988. 
 
The facts do not support the widely perpetuated myth that sudden hikes in malpractice 
insurance rates trigger physician shortages. In fact, the number of physicians who restrict or 
leave their practices in periods of rapid rate increases is no greater than the number who leave 
during normal, non “crisis” periods. 
 
The Harvard School of Public Health’s Michelle Mello and co-authors in a study funded by the 
Pew Charitable Trusts found that the number of physicians in “high risk” specialties in 
Pennsylvania who restricted or left their practices did not increase during that state’s purported 
malpractice “crisis.”55 
 
Using the administrative records of more than 47,000 doctors, including medical residents, 
from a state-run insurance fund in which most Pennsylvania doctors must participate, Mello 
and her colleagues looked closely at the behavior of physicians during that state’s so-called 
“crisis” in 1999-2002, when medical malpractice insurance premiums rose sharply. 
 
Contrary to predictions based on earlier physician surveys, they found that only a small 
percentage of high risk specialists reduced their scope of practice in the crisis period. “What’s 
more, the proportion of high-risk specialists who restricted their practices during the crisis 
period was not statistically different from the proportion that did so during 1993-1998, before 
premiums spiked.” 
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Below are a few further telling details on the study’s findings: 
 
• Fewer than 3 percent of high-risk specialists shifted annually from performing major 
procedures to only minor procedures or no procedures. 
 
• Only 8.2 percent of specialists performing only minor procedures stopped doing any 
procedures, shifting entirely to evaluation and management. 
 
• Most critically, the proportion of high-risk specialists who restricted their practices 
during the “crisis” period was not statistically different from the proportion that did so 
between 1993 and 1998, before premiums spiked. 
 
• The number of high-risk specialists who stopped practicing in Pennsylvania altogether 
during that state’s “crisis” period was more substantial: on average 15.5 percent left each 
year between 1999 and 2002. However, this percentage was not statistically different 
from the proportion of high-risk specialists who left the state during the pre-“crisis” 
period from 1993 to 1998, nor was it statistically different from the proportion of 
physicians in a comparison group of “low-risk” specialties who also left the state during 
the “crisis” period. 
 
• Moreover, when new physicians coming into the state were taken into account, the 
overall supply of specialists in high-risk fields did not decrease during the “crisis” 
period, except in obstetrics-gynecology. The ranks of Pennsylvania Ob-Gyns dipped 8 
percent from 1999 to 2002, but “this trend had begun before liability premiums soared, 
and it did not accelerate noticeably afterward. Further, the total number of physicians 
delivering babies, including family/general practitioners, did not fall significantly as a 
proportion of the population during the crisis,” Mello and her co-authors wrote. 
 
Don’t Believe It: Why Doctor Surveys on Medical Malpractice  
Insurance Impacts Are Misleading 
 
“Our analysis found more modest effects of the liability crisis on physician supply than have 
been suggested by physician survey studies, including our own,” Mello observed. In Mello’s 
earlier survey, “one-third or more reported their intention to retire or relocate their practices 
out of state within the next two years, and nearly half reported having reduced or eliminated 
high-risk aspects of their practices.” 
 
Mello and her co-authors identified several reasons why these survey results might have 
overstated the actual practice: 
 
• Survey results may exhibit “response bias.” 
 
• Conducting surveys only during periods of “crisis” – in which doctors overestimate the 
impact of medical malpractice insurance rate hikes on their practices – does not afford a 
realistic comparison to baseline rates of similar changes under different conditions. (For 
example the 8 percent “crisis”-period decrease in the number of Pennsylvania Ob-Gyns 
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may have appeared significant in isolation but, in fact, turned out to be part of an ongoing 
trend.) 
 
• Physician self-reports may inaccurately predict what doctors actually do in the future. 
“One study found that only 35 percent of surveyed physicians who reported an intention 
to cease clinical practice within three years actually did so,” Mello and her co-authors 
wrote. 
 
Pennsylvania’s experience is a lesson for New York. New Yorkers should resist the temptation 
to be swayed by survey-based claims that high-risk medical specialists will be driven from 
practice or forced to make undesirable practice changes due to an increase in liability 
premiums. In fact, as this report demonstrates, the physician population in New York is 
growing both overall and in most key specialty areas. 
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V. New York Doctors’ Incomes Will Likely Be Unaffected 
By Rising Insurance Premiums 
 
New York obstetricians say they are facing another crisis caused by increasing medical 
liability insurance premiums. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) and the Medical Society of New York both say rising premiums will reduce the number 
of Ob-Gyns who can afford to practice. “We’re seeing many Obs who aren’t willing to stay in 
practice because they just can’t afford it. Nationwide, malpractice-insurance premiums for Ob-
Gyns constitute about 5 percent of expenses. In New York State, they are 36 percent,” ACOG’s 
Donna Williams said.56 
 
Neither ACOG nor New York’s Medical Society, however, have provided detailed 
information on the net income earned by Ob-Gyns in New York over the past fifteen years. 
Without that type of information, it is impossible to evaluate these claims.57 
 
Understanding premiums’ effect on medical practices requires comparing actual 
premiums paid with total practice expenses and net practice income, according to authors Marc 
A. Rodwin and colleagues in a significant analysis published in 2006 issue of Health Affairs.58 
 
In a groundbreaking analysis of survey data conducted from 1970 to 2000 by the 
American Medical Association Center for Health Services Research and its successor, the Center 
for Health Policy Research, the authors concluded, “to paraphrase Mark Twain’s comment on 
reading his obituary in a newspaper, the reported recent demise of medical practice as a result of 
rising malpractice premiums has been greatly exaggerated.” 
 
The points below were among the study’s key findings: 
 
• Premiums have consistently made up only a small percentage of total practice 
expenses (except in the area of anesthesiology, a specialty that has much lower-than-
average expenses aside from premiums); 
 
• Premiums increased between 1996 and 2000 but had little impact on total practice 
expenses or net practice income nationally, within regions, or within practice 
specialties; and 
 
• Claims that the level of malpractice premiums justifies a tax credit (or other financial 
relief) to prevent physicians from leaving the practice of medicine are absurd, 
especially when physicians’ income is taken into consideration. The average 
physician’s income in 2003 was between the 95th and 99th percentile for all 
Americans. 
 
A second study using different data came to a very similar conclusion. “Physician net 
incomes were not reduced by high or rising premiums, and that gross practice revenues were 
higher when premiums were higher,” Mark Pauly and co-authors concluded in an article 
published in Forum for Health Economics & Policy.59 
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The study, which relied on the Medical Group Management Association’s (MGMA) 
annual survey data of a large set of single specialty group practices for the years 1994, 1998 and 
2002, reached the following conclusions: 
 
• In a large nationwide sample of group practices, higher malpractice premiums did not 
depress physician net incomes; and 
 
• By increasing prices and increasing quantity of profitable outputs, the physicians studied 
were able to offset the effect of higher premiums on their incomes. 
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VI. Recommendations 
 
The following recommendations provide general input based on our research regarding 
ways that New York could alleviate its insurance-industry difficulties and improve its patient-
safety record. The suggestions are not meant to be comprehensive. 
 
Insurance 
 
1. In a manner consistent with other health priorities, New York should restore the $691 million 
that was removed from the high-risk doctors’ insurance pool in the 1990s. The resulting 
funds, if unneeded, should be kept in reserve to insulate the state against future malpractice 
insurance crises or used for patient safety initiatives to offset the fund’s accommodation of 
high-risk doctors. 
 
2. New York should consider mandating a minimum cost-of-living adjustment to the annual 
increase to medical malpractice premiums. This step could help to mitigate the cyclical 
nature of premiums in the state. 
 
3. New York should ensure that its law guaranteeing the availability of insurance to licensed 
doctors does not require better-performing doctors – those who are able to obtain commercial 
insurance – to subsidize the premiums of very high-risk physicians. It should also re-evaluate 
the wisdom of – and the impact on patients of – its policy to insure all of the state’s 
physicians, including those with very poor records.  
 
Patient Safety 
 
1. A new task force should be appointed to investigate ways to improve patient safety in New 
York. This task force should focus on malpractice trends among facilities, procedures and 
specialties to determine areas ripe for improvement and it should recommend corresponding 
best-practices. The task force should investigate the sources and causes of the inexcusable 
errors that Medicare has labeled “never” events – such as wrong limb surgeries – and adverse 
incidents resulting in deaths, which have claimed the lives of an average of 555 New Yorkers 
every year since 1999. It should make bold recommendations to reduce these incidents 
dramatically. 
 
2. The state’s licensing board should affirmatively confirm that physicians who are unable to 
obtain commercial insurance are suited to continue practicing medicine. On the whole, these 
doctors commit malpractice at an alarming rate. Although they make up only about 1 percent 
of the state’s physicians and the premiums they pay have grown to nearly three times 
conventional malpractice insurance rates, these doctors were chiefly responsible for the 
roughly $500 million in red ink suffered this decade by the insurance program that covers 
them. The obligation of commercial insurance providers to cover the insurance program’s 
losses is, in turn, largely responsible for their solvency problems. 
 
At a minimum, the administrator of the high-risk doctors’ insurance program should have 
unrestricted authority to notify the state’s licensing board about physicians who are ill-suited 
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to continue practicing. The licensing board should, in turn, be required to provide the 
insurance program with a written, public response. 
 
3. New York’s Department of Health’s Office of Professional Medical Conduct should follow 
the recommendations of the state’s comptroller. Namely:  
 
-  The office should ensure that doctors meeting current medical malpractice criteria for 
investigation are, in fact, investigated;  
 
-  The office should broaden the medical malpractice criteria it uses to launch 
investigations;  
 
-  The office should develop a means to proactively identify potential incidents of medical 
misconduct, rather than relying on referrals from other agencies or medical malpractice 
records;  
 
-  The office should establish proper information-sharing channels with other agencies; and 
 
- The office should ensure that investigations are completed in a timely manner. 
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